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MURPHY v. LS.K. CON. OF NEW ENGLAND, INC.
AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: AN
ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS
UNDER THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution,1 as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment,2
prevents the states from prohibiting the free exercise of religion. The
concept of free exercise contains two components: belief and activity.3
Although the government cannot regulate religious beliefs,4 it may regu-
late conduct motivated by religious beliefs.5
Because religious beliefs are afforded absolute protection from gov-
ernment regulation, judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious
1. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. The relevant part of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall... deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV,
§ 1. The free exercise right is one of the liberty interests that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects. Eg., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77
(1990) ("The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment ... has been made applicable to
the States by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment .... " (citing Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940))).
However, the protection of the First Amendment is triggered only when there is "state
action" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Eg., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
111 S. Ct. 2513, 2517 (1991). When a state court applies state rules of law in a manner alleged
to restrict First Amendment freedoms, state action exists. Id; see, eg., Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886, 916 n.51 (1982); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). Thus, the
imposition of tort liability constitutes state action warranting constitutional scrutiny when
rights guaranteed by the Constitution are impinged. Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England,
Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 346 (Mass.), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 191 (1991); see, eg., Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 265.
3. E.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
4. E.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963); United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303; see infra notes 116-26 and
accompanying text.
5. E.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402-03; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at
304; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879). The Free Exercise Clause "em-
braces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protec-
tion of society." Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04.
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beliefs is prohibited. However, when the religious status of a party is
disputed, courts can inquire into whether or not alleged "religious" be-
liefs are, in fact, "religious" in nature and thus qualify for protection
under the Free Exercise Clause.7
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently applied the
Free Exercise Clause in Murphy v. LS.K Con. of New England, Inc.8 In
Murphy the court held that the admission in evidence of scriptural
passages of the Krishna Consciousness religion,9 as the basis of the plain-
tiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, 10 was constitu-
tionally impermissible as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause." In
vacating a trial court judgment in favor of the plaintiff,12 the court said
the trial judge should have granted the defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on the plaintiff's intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim.
13
While the court's reliance on the Free Exercise Clause was appropri-
ate, 14 the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim could also have
been disposed of under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
ment, 5 which, like the Free Exercise Clause, applies to the states
6. E.g., Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86; see infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
7. E.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965); see, eg., Malnak v. Yogi, 592
F.2d 197, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1979) (affirming district court finding that Science of Creative Intel-
ligence/Transcendental Meditation is religion for purposes of First Amendment's Establish-
ment Clause). To qualify for First Amendment protection, the claimant also must show that
the religious beliefs are sincerely held. E.g., Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185; see, e.g., Ballard, 322 U.S.
at 81-82, 84, 88; United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 444-46 (D.D.C. 1968).
8. 571 N.E.2d 340 (Mass.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 191 (1991).
9. Krishna Consciousness is also known as the Hare Krishna religion. Id. at 342. The
religious status of I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc. (ISKCON N.E.), the defendant, was un-
disputed at trial. Id at 342 n.3. Susan Murphy, the plaintiff whose claim this Note addresses,
"stipulated that Krishna Consciousness is an established religion and that ISKCON N.E. is a
religious organization sincerely dedicated to the ideals of Krishna Consciousness." Id.
10. In Murphy there were two plaintiffs, Susan Murphy and her mother, Mary Murphy.
d at 342. Their case went to trial on six separate counts of tortious activity, including sepa-
rate claims by both Susan and Mary of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 344.
This Note will address only Susan's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. For a
discussion of the facts of the case, including the various tort claims, see infra notes 26-69 and
accompanying text.
11. Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 345-50; see infra notes 70-103 and accompanying text.
12. Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 354; see infra note 103.
13. Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 350; see infra note 103 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 116-30 and accompanying text.
15. The Free Speech Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The court did not address the free speech issue because no free speech defense was raised
in Murphy. See Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 342. Such a defense was unnecessary due to the free
exercise defense, see id., as the religious status of both Krishna Consciousness and ISKCON
N.E. were undisputed at trial, see supra note 9.
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through the Fourteenth Amendment.' 6 If free exercise concerns were
placed aside, the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim could not have survived free speech analysis. Because the defend-
ant's expressions of belief upon which the plaintiff's claim was based 7
were not provable as false, the statements were not actionable.' 8
While the free speech defense was unnecessary in Murphy, as there
was no dispute over the religious status of the defendant, 9 the religious
status of a party is not always so clear.2" Therefore, future cases involv-
ing alleged religious beliefs may raise a serious question as to whether or
not the Free Exercise Clause applies.2 '
In such cases involving facts otherwise similar to those in Murphy,
the Free Speech Clause could be used to dispose of intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims,2 2 making it unnecessary for courts to engage
in the difficult determination of whether the defendant qualifies for the
protection afforded by the Free Exercise Clause.23 Reliance on the Free
Exercise Clause is unnecessary because the Free Speech Clause abso-
lutely prohibits intentional infliction of emotional distress claims predi-
cated on speech on matters of public concern not provably false.24 Only
when speech is provably false is the Free Exercise Clause necessary to
shield defendants from liability.
25
This Note first summarizes the facts and reasoning of Murphy.
Next, it analyzes the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's application
16. E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("[F]reedom of speech... which
[is] protected by the First Amendment... [is] among the fundamental personal rights and
'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment
by the States."). See supra note 2 for the text of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.
17. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 157-263 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 9.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197
(3d Cir. 1979); see infra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
22. In recent years, a number of cases have been reported involving former religious cult
members' tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the respective cults
to which the members belonged. See, e.g., Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 46 Cal.
3d 1092, 762 P.2d 46, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989); Christoff-
erson v. Church of Scientology, 644 P.2d 577 (Ct. App.), petition denied, 650 P.2d 928 (Or.
1982), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 1206, and cert denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983); see also Ann P.
Wrosch, Comment, Undue Influence, Involuntary Servitude and Brainwashing: A More Con-
sistent, Interests-Based Approach, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 499 (1992) (discussing intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims in cases involving religious cults).
23. See infra notes 157-263 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 182-202 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 182-202 and accompanying text.
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of the Free Exercise Clause to the plaintiff's intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress claim. After concluding that the court correctly decided
the case under the Free Exercise Clause, this Note suggests an alternative
basis for resolving Murphy under the Free Speech Clause. This Note
discusses the potential advantages of the alternative approach in future
cases and then examines Murphy as a free speech case. This Note con-
cludes that when it is uncertain whether or not the Free Exercise Clause
applies in cases otherwise factually similar to Murphy, courts should first
look to the Free Speech Clause and only turn to the Free Exercise Clause
if the speech at issue is actionable under the Free Speech Clause.
II. MURPHY v. LS.K CON. OF NEW ENGLAND, INC
A. Facts
In late 1971 thirteen-year-old Susan Murphy began exploring the
beliefs of the Hare Krishna religion, also known as Krishna Conscious-
ness.26 Susan periodically attended Sunday feasts at a Krishna temple in
Boston prior to the summer of 1972, at which time she began to visit the
temple more often after becoming acquainted with Doug Hewer, an oc-
casional Krishna Consciousness practitioner approximately six years her
senior.' Hewer became Susan's boyfriend during the fall of 1972.28
Mary Murphy, Susan's mother, did not learn of her daughter's in-
terest in Krishna Consciousness or frequent attendance at the Krishna
temple in Boston until February or March of 1973.29 Mary then forbade
her daughter from attending the temple again, but Susan ignored Mary
and secretly continued visiting the temple.30
In February 1973, Susan, while meeting with Hewer and a Krishna
sannyasi3' named Vishnu-Jana, expressed her "desire to become
'Krishna conscious' by living according to the principles of Krishna Con-
sciousness."' 32 She also informed Vishnu-lana that Mary was unwilling
to permit Susan's attendance at the Krishna temple.33 Vishnu-Jana then
told Susan and Hewer that "the most important goal for Susan was to
become Krishna conscious," and that Susan should therefore do any-
26. Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 342.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 342-43.
29. Id. at 343.
30. Id.
31. A sannyasi, or swami, is a spiritual authority in the Krishna Consciousness religion.
Id. at 343 & n.4.
32. Id. at 343.
33. Id.
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thing necessary to attain her goal. 4 After this meeting, Susan and
Hewer presented themselves as a married couple, as they deemed them-
selves married by the power of Vishnu-Jana's advice.
Approximately one month later, Susan ran away with Hewer, first
to Toronto and then to Los Angeles. 36 Susan and Hewer received assist-
ance from several Krishna Consciousness practitioners who befriended
them during their travels.37 In the fall of 1973, Susan spoke with her
mother by telephone and, after returning with Hewer to Massachusetts,
resumed living with her mother.38 About two months later, Susan and
Hewer again ran away to Toronto and then to Los Angeles.39 While in
Los Angeles, they were regular visitors to a Krishna temple." They then
moved to Hawaii before returning to Massachusetts to live together in
late 1973 or early 1974.41 After several weeks, they were on the move
again, first to Los Angeles for several more weeks, then to Pittsburgh,
where they lived in a local Krishna temple.42
In February 1974, I.S.K.Con. of New England Inc. (ISKCON
N.E.), the defendant, was incorporated in Massachusetts.43 Susan and
Hewer returned to Massachusetts in the summer of 1974 and one month
later moved into the apartment of two ISKCON N.E. temple members.'
Susan visited the temple and regularly participated in ISKCON N.E. ac-
tivities.45 After Susan and Hewer moved into the apartment of two other
temple members around September 1974, they moved to another apart-
ment." In November 1974, Susan and Hewer requested the temple pres-
ident's permission to move into ISKCON N.E.'s temple.47 The temple's
president said Susan could live in the temple only if Mary consented and
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id
37. Id
38. Id
39. Id
40. Id.
41. Id Clearly, the case's statement of the facts includes some inaccuracies regarding the
timing of certain events. According to the "facts" of the case, Susan and Hewer: (1) returned
to Massachusetts "in the fall of 1973"; (2) stayed in Massachusetts for "[a]pproximately two
months"; (3) traveled to Toronto; (4) moved to Los Angeles, where they stayed for "several
months"; (5) moved to Hawaii; and (6) returned to Massachusetts in "late 1973 or early 1974."
Id. (emphases added).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Susan agreed to participate regularly in temple activities, maintain a veg-
etarian diet and refrain from gambling, intoxicants and illicit sex.4 1 Su-
san agreed to these conditions and her mother gave permission, on
certain conditions, for Susan to live in the temple.49
Susan and Hewer moved into ISKCON N.E.'s temple, but slept
apart, in the women's and men's quarters, respectively."0 Hewer and Su-
san disagreed over her wish "to remain celibate in accordance with
Krishna principles," and, apparently as a result of this disagreement,
Hewer left the temple." At this point, Susan ceased to consider herself
married to Hewer. 2 While living at the temple, Susan regularly partici-
pated in Krishna Consciousness practices at the temple." In December
1974 or January 1975, Susan agreed to her mother's request to sleep at
Mary's house on weekends, but Susan still spent most of her time at the
temple. 4 Susan formally became a Krishna Consciousness "devotee" in
January or February 1975.1' Shortly thereafter Susan began to spend all
her nights at her mother's house, though she still spent her days at the
temple.
5 6
In April 1975, Mary discovered that several members of ISKCON
N.E.'s temple planned to send her daughter to West Germany without
Mary's knowledge or consent.5 7 Mary then enlisted the help of a police
officer, Henry Vanasse, who agreed to speak with Susan." After Vanasse
told Susan that she might face legal action if she ran away again, Susan
reluctantly agreed to her mother's demand that she sever all ties with the
temple.5 9
In April 1977, approximately two years after withdrawing from the
temple, Susan sued ISKCON N.E. for intentional infliction of emotional
distress." At trial she presented evidence allegedly demonstrating that
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id
51. Id
52. Id.
53. Id. at 343-44.
54. Id. at 344.
55. Id.
56. Id
57. Id
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Originally, Susan and Mary filed a complaint that alleged nine causes of action
against three different defendants, including ISKCON N.E. Id. By the time the case went to
trial in May 1987, ISKCON N.E. was the sole remaining defendant and had been granted
summary judgment an Susan's claims of false imprisonment and fraud and Mary's claim of
seduction. Id. The case went to trial on five counts in addition to Susan's claim of intentional
1414 [Vol. 25:1409
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her experience with ISKCON N.E. caused her "to experience 'post-
traumatic stress disorder,' a low sense of self-esteem, and an inability to
maintain a healthy relationship with men."'" She was allowed to read
passages from scriptural texts to the jury and to testify as to what she had
learned with respect to the role of women in Krishna Consciousness.62
She testified that she learned the following from certain scriptural texts:
"(1) 'women are inferior to men'; (2) 'the female form is the form of
evil'; and (3) 'one should be very -qareful to cover the body so that men
are not attracted to [women].' "63 She also testified that she learned from
other scriptural passages that:
([4]) "it is better for a woman to have to bear a son and that
female children are not as good as male children"; ([5]) "[wo-
infliction of emotional distress. Id Mary brought her own claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id. Susan and Mary brought separate claims of intentional interference
with the Murphy family structure. Id. Susan's remaining claims were that ISKCON N.E.
failed in its duty to provide adequately for her welfare while she was under its care and aided
and abetted Hewer's commission of assault and battery on her by way of nonconsensual sexual
intercourse. Id. ISKCON N.E.'s potential liability was limited to its actions during the time
period between its incorporation and Susan's departure from its temple. Id.
Under Massachusetts law, a defendant is subject to liability for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress when the defendant, "by extreme and outrageous conduct and
without privilege, causes severe emotional distress to another." Agis v. Howard Johnson Co.,
355 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Mass. 1976). Massachusetts follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts
in allowing the plaintiff to recover for emotional distress as well as bodily harm resulting from
such distress. Id at 317-18; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). Virtually all
states today recognize the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as defined in the
Restatement. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1029 (5th ed. 1990);
see Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988); Agis, 355 N.E.2d at 317 n.3.
A plaintiff must establish four elements to prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. E.g., Agis, 355 N.E.2d at 318. First, the plaintiff must show that the de-
fendant intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have known that the plaintiff
would suffer emotional distress due to the defendant's conduct. E.g., id.; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, supra, § 46 cmt. i. Second, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's
conduct was so outrageous and extreme that society regards the conduct as atrocious, intolera-
ble and beyond all bounds of decency. E.g., Agis, 355 N.E.2d at 319; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS, supra, § 46 cmt. d. The requirement of extreme and outrageous conduct
means that a defendant cannot be liable for "mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances,
petty oppressions, or other trivialities." Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 508 N.E.2d 72, 82 (Mass.
1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra, § 46 cmt. d. "The extreme and outrageous
character of the conduct may arise from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly
susceptible to emotional distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiar-
ity." IA cmt. f. Third, the defendant's conduct must be shown to be the cause of the plain-
tiff's distress. E.g., Agis, 355 N.E.2d at 319; R.STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra, § 46.
And fourth, the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff must be severe and of a nature
that a reasonable person could not be expected to endure it. E.g., Agis, 355 N.E.2d at 319;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra, § 46 cmt. j.
61. Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 344.
62. Id. at 346.
63. Id. (alteration in original).
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men] should always consult a higher person before making any
type of decision because women are less intelligent than men";
and ([6]) "the woman has no position which is independent of
man and she should take her husband as her spiritual
authority." 4
Additionally, Susan's expert psychiatric witness testified that Susan "suf-
fered from 'post-traumatic stress disorder' from her 'experience in the
Hare Krishna movement.' ,65
ISKCON N.E. moved for a directed verdict on two separate occa-
sions, but the trial court denied these motions. 6 The jury then found for
Susan on her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, awarding
her $210,000 on this count.67 The court denied ISKCON N.E.'s motions
for new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 8 The Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court took the case on its own motion after
ISKCON N.E. appealed.69
B. Reasoning of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
In Murphy the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the
judgment against ISKCON N.E. violated the Free Exercise Clause of the
United States Constitution.70 The court agreed with ISKCON N.E.'s
contention that the introduction of substantial and detailed testimony re-
garding the unorthodox religious beliefs of Krishna Consciousness de-
prived ISKCON N.E. of its free exercise rights because the jury was
allowed to impose tort liability on ISKCON N.E. as punishment for the
content of these beliefs.71
The court began its analysis by noting that in cases where First
Amendment issues are raised, an appellate court must independently re-
view the trial record. 72 In such a situation, "'an appellate court has an
64. Idk at 346 n.8 (third alteration in original).
65. Id at 347. ISKCON N.E. claimed that Susan's testimony regarding what she learned
from certain scriptural passages, see supra text accompanying notes 63-64, formed the basis of
the expert's opinion. Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 346-47.
66. Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 345.
67. Id
68. Id.
69. Id
70. Id. at 345, 350. ISKCON N.E. also claimed the judgment violated the state free exer-
cise guarantee, but because its brief to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court only dis-
cussed the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the
court only addressed the First Amendment in considering ISKCON N.E.'s claims. Id. at 345
& n.7.
71. Id. at 345.
72. Id.
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obligation to "make an independent examination of the whole record" in
order to make sure that "the judgment does not constitute a forbidden
intrusion on the field of free expression." ',7 Constitutional scrutiny is
required in this case because religious freedom is potentially threatened
when tort liability is imposed for acts allegedly motivated by religious
belief.74
Next, the court stated that while religiously motivated conduct is
not immune from government regulation, religious beliefs are absolutely
protected by the First Amendment.7' As a result, the court found the
jury's verdict constitutionally problematic because the admission in evi-
dence of certain scriptural passages 76 endangered "ISKCON N.E.'s right
to believe freely in the principles of Krishna Consciousness."
'77
Susan admitted that the jury was allowed "to consider the content of
[ISKCON N.E.'s] religious scriptures."7 Her brief even stated "that
'[s]ome of [her] damages flow from the religious beliefs and practices to
which [she] was exposed while she was a member of the Defendant's
religious community.' "9 Despite this, however, Susan suggested that
her claim was based on ISKCON N.E.'s actions of teaching its religious
beliefs to her, rather than on its beliefs per se.8 °
The court was unpersuaded by Susan's attempt to characterize her
testimony as pertaining to ISKCON N.E.'s activity as opposed to its be-
lief." "The essence of what occurred in the trial is that [Susan was]
allowed to suggest to the jury extensively that exposure to the defend-
ant's religious beliefs was sufficient to cause tortious emotional damage
.*.. ." To support its conclusion, the court also mentioned the fact that
the trial judge instructed the jury, in admitting Susan's disputed scrip-
tural testimony, that the testimony was to be used to ascertain whether
or not Susan was exposed to the Krishna teachings and, if she was, how
these teachings affected her, if at all. 3 Additionally, Susan's counsel, in
his closing argument to the jury, contended that Susan suffered
psychological damage because she was subjected to the Krishna teach-
73. Id. (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499
(1984)).
74. Id at 346.
75. Id.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
77. Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 346.
78. Id. at 347.
79. Id (first alteration in original).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id
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ings as a juvenile.84
Since Susan's tort claim was based on the alleged emotional damage
she suffered as a result of exposure to ISKCON N.E.'s religious beliefs,
the court reasoned that her claim was proscribed by the Free Exercise
Clause, which guarantees freedom of religious belief, including the free-
dom to maintain theories which others may think heretical.8 5 The court
stated: "'Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be
put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs.' ,86 However, the
court recognized that at trial ISKCON N.E. was required to pursue a
course forbidden by the First Amendment; it was forced to try to con-
vince the jury that the religious beliefs of Krishna Consciousness are
worthy of respect.
8 7
The court observed that inherent in Susan's claim that she suffered
tortious damage because of exposure to these beliefs is the view that
ISKCON N.E.'s religious beliefs are fundamentally abnormal and in-
compatible with a proper notion of human development.8 8 The court
remarked that this issue may properly be the subject of scholarly or theo-
logical debates, but it is not an issue for courts to decide.8 9 ISKCON
N.E. "cannot be forced to choose between censoring its religious scrip-
tures to remove material which may be offensive to contemporary society
and paying tort damages for the privilege of maintaining unpopular reli-
gious beliefs."90
While Susan's age had some significance constitutionally, because "a
State has greater leeway under the First Amendment to infringe on reli-
gious activity involving children than it does on religious activity which
involves only adults,"91 the court believed her minority did not alleviate
the free exercise concerns raised in this case.92 The court reasoned that if
Susan's claim were based on ISKCON N.E.'s religiously motivated activ-
ity, her age might reduce the level of constitutional protection afforded
ISKCON N.E.93 However, Susan's claim required the court to assess the
propriety of ISKCON N.E.'s beliefs, regardless of her age.94 The court
84. Id. at 348.
85. Id
86. Id. (quoting United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944)).
87. Id
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id at 349.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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refused to engage in such an assessment. 9 In support of its position, the
court noted that Susan learned the scriptures at issue during regularly
scheduled temple meetings, and under the Constitution courts lack com-
petence "'to approve, disapprove, classify, regulate, or in any manner
control sermons delivered at religious meetings.',96
The court also found that the trial judge compounded the error of
allowing the jury to consider ISKCON N.E.'s religious beliefs by errone-
ously instructing the jury that the First Amendment does not protect
defendants from intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.97
This erroneous instruction "may have invited the jury to ignore the de-
fendant's free exercise rights in determining ISKCON N.E.'s tort liabil-
ity."9 8 The court said that in certain circumstances the Free Exercise
Clause protects activity which constitutes an intentional tort.99 Whether
a particular tort claim is barred by the Free Exercise Clause depends on
"factors such as the nature of the evidence which must be presented to
support such a claim, or the effect that liability for a successful claim
would have on free exercise rights."'" For example, it has been "held
that claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress are barred by
the First Amendment to the extent they are based on protected religious
speech."101
The court concluded that Susan's intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim "could not stand in the absence of testimony regarding
ISKCON N.E.'s religious beliefs."' 0 2 Therefore, the court said ISKCON
N.E.'s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have
been granted.
103
III. ANALYSIS
The court in Murphy correctly held that the judgment against
ISKCON N.E. was impermissible. Under the Free Exercise Clause, the
95. Id.
96. Id. at 349 n.11 (quoting Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953)).
97. Id. at 349.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 349-50.
101. Id. at 350 (citing Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1120,
762 P.2d 46, 61, 252 Cal. Rptr. 122, 137 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989)).
102. Id.
103. Id. The court, in vacating the judgment on Susan's intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim and remanding the remaining claims for retrial, id. at 354, stated that on retrial,
Susan's alleged damages for "intentional infliction of emotional distress may be considered to
the extent that such damages are an element of the claims of physical and sexual abuse of
Susan," id. at 350 (emphasis added).
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government is absolutely prohibited from regulating religious beliefs."4
Because Susan's claim essentially was that exposure to ISKCON N.E.'s
religious beliefs caused her emotional damage,105 the judgment against
ISKCON N.E. amounted to an improper regulation of those beliefs.106
In Murphy though, the Free Exercise Clause was not necessary to
shield ISKCON N.E. from liability. Wholly apart from free exercise
concerns, the Free Speech Clause could have protected ISKCON N.E.
There obviously was no need to resort to the Free Speech Clause in
Murphy, as it was undisputed that ISKCON N.E. qualified for the Free
Exercise Clause's absolute protection.10 7 However, not all parties who
claim their beliefs are religious qualify for protection under the Free Ex-
ercise Clause.108 Therefore, in future cases where the applicability of the
Free Exercise Clause is contested, the free exercise question becomes
moot if the beliefs at issue are immunized by the Free Speech Clause. 109
While the Free Speech Clause does not provide absolute protec-
tion,110 it amply shelters speech that falls under its umbrella. Under the
decision and rationale of the United States Supreme Court in Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,"' intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims are limited by the Free Speech Clause.' 1 2 When the result in
Falwell is combined with the Court's opinion in Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., l3 it is clear that a defendant's speech on matters of public
concern is not actionable for intentional infliction of emotional distress
unless the speech is provably false. 4 Since the speech at issue in
Murphy was not provably false, the outcome of the case did not hinge on
ISKCON N.E.'s status as a religious organization.1
A. Murphy Under the Free Exercise Clause
The court was correct in disposing of the intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim on free exercise grounds. As ISKCON N.E.'s
religious status was undisputed, ISKCON N.E. unquestionably qualified
104. See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 9.
108. See infra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 203-63 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
111. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
112. See infra notes 157-202 and accompanying text.
113. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
114. See infra notes 182-202, 213-44 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 250-63 and accompanying text.
1420 [Vol. 25:1409
FREE SPEECH AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
for free exercise protection," 6 which, through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,117 absolutely prohibits state regulation of religious beliefs."' As
the United States Supreme Court recently reiterated in Employment Divi-
sion, Department of Human Resources v. Smith:119
The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right
to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.
Thus, the First Amendment obviously excludes all "govern-
mental regulation of religious beliefs as such." The government
may not compel affirmation of religious belief, punish the ex-
pression of religious doctrines it believes to be false, impose spe-
cial disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious
status, or lend its power to one or the other side in controver-
sies over religious authority or dogma. 120
The Court first addressed the constitutionality of judicial determina-
tions of the truth or falsity of religious beliefs in United States v. Bal-
lard. '2 In that case, the respondents, leaders of the "I Am" movement,
were convicted of using and conspiring to use the mails to defraud.'22
The respondents had been charged with soliciting funds and seeking
membership in the "I Am" movement by making knowingly false repre-
sentations, covering their alleged religious doctrines or beliefs, regarding
their ability to cure diseases. 2 3 The Court held that the Free Exercise
Clause would be violated if the jury were allowed to determine the truth
or falsity of the respondents' representations. 24 The jury could only de-
cide whether the respondents sincerely believed the representations they
made. 2 ' The Court stated:
Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief,
is basic in a society of free men. It embraces the right to main-
tain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are
rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths. Heresy trials
are foreign to our Constitution. Men may believe what they
cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their reli-
116. See supra note 9.
117. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
118. E.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877
(1990); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86
(1944); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
119. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
120. Id. at 877 (citations omitted) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)).
121. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
122. Id. at 79.
123. Id. at 79-80.
124. Id. at 86.
125. See id. at 84-88.
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gious doctrines or beliefs.... The religious views espoused by
respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most
people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury
charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be
done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of
fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain.126
In light of both Ballard and Smith, the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court decided Susan's claim in Murphy correctly. As Susan's
claim rested on the notion that exposure to the beliefs of Krishna Con-
sciousness caused her psychological damage,12 7 her claim could not be
126. d at 86-87 (citation omitted). In addition to the free exercise guarantee, the First
Amendment forbids governmental establishment of religion. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The Es-
tablishment Clause, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947), prohibits, among other things, excessive church-state
entanglement, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). Any judicial determination of
religious "truth," in addition to violating the Free Exercise Clause, would seem to run afoul of
the Establishment Clause by excessively entangling the government with religion. See Ballard,
322 U.S. 78; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW § 14-11 (2d ed. 1988).
For the text of the Establishment Clause, see supra note 1.
127. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text. If the court had accepted Susan's sug-
gestion that her claim was based on ISKCON N.E.'s religious activity rather than its religious
beliefs, see supra note 80 and accompanying text, ISKCON N.E. would not have received
absolute First Amendment protection because the government may legitimately regulate con-
duct motivated by religious beliefs. E.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67
(1879).
Under free exercise jurisprudence before Smith, government regulation that substantially
burdened religiously motivated conduct could only be justified by means narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling government interest. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring);
see, e.g., Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252, 257-58 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at
403. However, this is no longer the case, at least in the criminal law context. In Smith the
Court held the compelling government interest test inapplicable to challenges, based solely on
free exercise grounds, of generally applicable criminal laws. 494 U.S. at 884-85. However, in a
"hybrid situation," id at 882, where a free exercise challenge to a generally applicable criminal
law is joined "with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the
press," id) at 881, the compelling government interest test apparently still applies. See id. at
881-82.
Outside the criminal law context, it is unclear whether the compelling government inter-
est test still applies to free exercise challenges when religiously motivated conduct is burdened,
because the Court has not yet addressed this question. Wrosch, supra note 22, at 515 n.147;
see, eg., Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 932 (6th Cir. 1991). How-
ever, language in Smith, see, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 878 ("[I]f prohibiting the exercise of
religion.., is not the object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applica-
ble and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended." (emphasis
added)); id. at 885 ("The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of
socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, 'cannot
depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual
1422
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adjudicated12  without offending the Free Exercise Clause.1 29 If tort lia-
bility could be imposed on ISKCON N.E. because a jury finds ISKCON
N.E.'s beliefs improper or offensive, "little indeed would be left of reli-
gious freedom." 
130
B. Advantages of the Free Speech Approach in Future Cases
Although the Free Exercise Clause forbids inquiry into the truth or
falsity of religious beliefs,13 1 courts are permitted to determine as a
threshold matter whether or not alleged "religious" beliefs are, in fact,
"religious" in nature.132 "Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by
the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to
the exercise of religion."'
133
Judicial determinations of what is "religious" present obvious
problems, not the least of which is arriving at a workable definition of
"religion." Courts have not settled on a uniform approach to defining
religion.' 34 Since "[theologians, sociologists, and others have struggled
mightily with definitional questions"'135 regarding religion, this result is
development.'" (emphasis added) (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988))), lower court interpretations of Smith, e.g., Vandiver, 925
F.2d at 932 ("While Smith addresses the conflict between a criminal statute and behavior
allegedly protected by the free exercise clause, other circuits have extended its holding to neu-
tral civil statutes as well."); Salvation Army v. Department of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d
183, 195 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[T]he rationale of the Smith opinion is not logically confined to cases
involving criminal statutes."); see, e.g., Rector of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New
York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1103 (1991); Intercommunity Ctr.
for Justice & Peace v. INS, 910 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1990), and other Supreme Court decisions, see
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991) (applying generally applicable state prom-
issory estoppel law against newspaper publisher without heightened scrutiny because law only
incidentally burdened freedom of press guaranteed by First Amendment), indicate that the
Smith rationale applies to all regulation of religiously motivated conduct.
Although government regulation of ISKCON N.E.'s "activity" would not be absolutely
barred, presumably the judgment against ISKCON N.E. could only be justified if it passed the
strict scrutiny of the compelling interest test. This is either because the Smith rationale might
only apply to criminal statutes, or, much more likely, because Susan's claim involved a hybrid
situation where a free exercise claim is connected with the communicative activity of teaching
religious beliefs.
128. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86-87.
130. Id. at 87.
131. See supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
132. E.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965); see, e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592
F.2d 197, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1979) (affirming district court finding that Science of Creative Intel-
ligence/Transcendental Meditation is religion for Establishment Clause purposes).
133. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981).
134. TRIBE, supra note 126, § 14-12, at 1243.
135. Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933, 957 (1989).
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not surprising. The United States Supreme Court has held that purely
secular philosophies do not constitute "religion." ' Additionally, the
Court has noted that some asserted religious beliefs may be "so bizarre,
so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection
under the Free Exercise Clause." '137 However, there appears to be a low
threshold for proving that a belief is "religious." I3 Despite this low
threshold, courts have on occasion held that a belief is not "religious." ' 13 9
While the Free Exercise Clause's protection of religion demands
that "religion" be defined, a broad definition of religion is required in
order to achieve the goals of religious freedom, as the number and diver-
sity of faiths is increasing."4 However, an overly broad definition would
protect some beliefs that were not intended to be protected by the
clause.141 Furthermore, "[e]xcessive judicial inquiry into religious beliefs
may, in and of itself, constrain religious liberty." '142
Therefore, where the defendant's religious status is earnestly dis-
puted in cases otherwise factually similar to Murphy v. LS.K Con. of New
136. TRIBE, supra note 126, § 14-12, at 1243; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216
(1972) ("[mlf the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejec-
tion of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority ... their claims would not
rest on a religious basis.... [A] choice [which is merely] philosophical and personal... does
not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.").
137. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
138. TRIBE, supra note 126, § 14-12, at 1243. For example, in Thomas, the claimant admit-
ted he was "struggling" with his beliefs. 450 U.S. at 715. His actions seemed inconsistent with
his beliefs, TRIBE, supra note 126, § 14-12, at 1243; see Thomas, 450 U.S. at 711 & n.3, and he
disagreed with other members of his religion about what actions their religion forbade, id. at
715-16. Nevertheless, the Free Exercise Clause applied, as "religious beliefs need not be ac-
ceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection." Id. at 714.
139. See, e.g., Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that belief
system called MOVE was not religion; claimant had referred to MOVE as revolutionary or-
ganization and MOVE lacked organization, structure, clergy, ceremonial functions, formal
services, holiday observances and other characteristics typically associated with traditional re-
ligions), cert denied, 456 U.S. 908 (1982); Theriault v. Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Tex.)
(holding that Church of the New Song, whose leader had acquired Doctor of Divinity Certifi-
cate by mail order, was not religion; sole purpose of "religion" was to cause or encourage
disruption of prison discipline for sake of disruption), appeal dismissed, 579 F.2d 302 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979).
140. TRIBE, supra note 126, § 14-6, at 1180-81.
141. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 812 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Under
the Free Exercise Clause, religiously motivated claims of conscience may give rise to constitu-
tional rights that other strongly held beliefs do not."); TRIBE, supra note 126, § 14-6, at 1182
("To be sure, courts should be wary of sudden births of religions that entitle practitioners to
special rights or exemptions.").
142. TRIBE, supra note 126, § 14-6, at 1181; see id. §§ 14-11 to -12. Any such inquiry also
runs the risk of violating the Establishment Clause's proscription of excessive church-state
entanglement. See supra note 126.
[Vol. 25:14091424
FREE SPEECH AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
England, Inc. , protection under the Free Exercise Clause may not be
readily available. However, in intentional infliction of emotional distress
cases predicated on alleged "religious" speech, reliance on the Free Exer-
cise Clause is not required if the speech at issue is immunized by the Free
Speech Clause. Indeed, if the speech at issue is not actionable under the
Free Speech Clause, the free exercise question becomes irrelevant. Thus,
courts should first look to the Free Speech Clause; only if the speech is
actionable under that clause must the court turn to the Free Exercise
Clause.
C. The Free Speech Clause's Limitations on Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress Claims: Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell
According to the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution, "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech."'" The Free Speech Clause applies to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.' 45
Although the free speech right is a fundamental one, "it is well un-
derstood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and
under all circumstances."'" For example, "certain well-defined and nar-
rowly limited classes of speech,"' 47 such as "'fighting' words"'14  and
obscene speech,' 49 are unprotected by the First Amendment. These
classes consist of speech "which by [its] very utterance infiict[s] injury or
tend[s] to incite an immediate breach of the peace."' 50 Such utterances
"are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality."'
151
143. 571 N.E.2d 340 (Mass.), cerL denied, 112 S. Ct. 191 (1991).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
145. E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("[F]reedom of speech... which
[is] protected by the First Amendment ... [is] among the fundamental personal rights and
'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment
by the States.").
146. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
147. Id.
148. Id at 572.
149. E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
150. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
151. Id The language in Chaplinsky is based on Justice Holmes's "marketplace of ideas"
theory of the First Amendment. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Under this theory, freedom of speech is a means to the end of discov-
ering "truth." E.g., TRIBE, supra note 126, § 12-1, at 785-86. In his famous Abrams dissent,
Justice Holmes stated:
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Additionally, even when a form of speech is protected by the First
Amendment, the protection is not absolute. When the government's ac-
tion is not aimed at the communicative impact of speech but incidentally
restricts the flow of information, the constitutionality of the govern-
ment's action is tested by a balancing of the government interest against
the adverse effect on free expression.152 When a governmental regulation
is aimed at the communicative impact of protected speech,5 3 the reg-
ulation violates the First Amendment unless it is necessary to further a
compelling government interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that in-
terest,' or it is aimed at a less protected category of speech and meets
the relevant test for that category.' When none of the categorical tests
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have
no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your
heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To
allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent ....
or that you do not care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your
power or your premises. But when men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foun-
dations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution .... I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to
check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death,
unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and press-
ing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
152. "[R]egulatory choices aimed at harms not caused by ideas or information as such are
acceptable so long as they do not unduly constrict the flow of information and ideas." TRIBE.,
supra note 126, § 12-2, at 791; see, eg., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989) (government may impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on protected
speech if restrictions are justified without reference to speech content and narrowly tailored to
further significant government interest while leaving open ample alternative channels to com-
municate message); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (when "speech" is
combined with "nonspeech" elements in same course of conduct, government regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within constitutional power of government and if incidental restric-
tion on free speech is no greater than is essential to furtherance of important or substantial
government interest unrelated to suppression of free expression). For a critical look at Ward
as well as an excellent summary of First Amendment analysis, see Carney R. Shegerian, A Sign
of the Times: The United States Supreme Court Effectively Abolishes the Narrowly Tailored
Requirement for Time, Place and Manner Restrictions, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 453 (1992).
153. Such restrictions can be either content-based, see, eg., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214
(1966) (invalidating prohibition against electioneering or soliciting votes on election day for or
against candidate or proposition), or viewpoint-based, see, eg., Stromberg v. California, 283
U.S. 359 (1931) (invalidating state's attempt to ban display of red flag which symbolically
opposed government).
154. E.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
155. Examples of such less protected categories of speech include indecent speech, see, e.g.,
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), nonobscene sexually explicit speech, see, e.g.,
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), commercial speech, see, e.g.,
1426
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are satisfied and the government attempts to justify its regulation as nar-
rowly tailored and necessary to further a compelling government inter-
est, the regulation will be invalidated if further speech could avert the
harm feared; in such a situation, suppression of speech is unnecessary to
further the government interest.'56
Until 1988 the United States Supreme Court had not addressed the
question of whether the First Amendment is implicated when an inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress"5 7 claim involves speech by the de-
fendant on publicly important matters.1 5' Then, in Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell,"5 9 the Court found that a state's interest in shielding pub-
lic figures from the intentional infliction of emotional distress was insuffi-
cient to deny First Amendment protection to patently offensive
speech. 6'
Falwell involved a parody of an advertisment which included Jerry
Falwell's' 61 name and picture that was published in Hustler, a nationally
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), and defama-
tory speech, see, eg., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In the area of
defamation, a number of specific tests have been developed, depending on whether the plaintiff
is a public or a private figure and whether the speech addresses a matter of public or "purely
private concern." Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759
(1985) (Powell, J., plurality). When the plaintiff is a public official and the alleged defamatory
statement relates to the plaintiff's official conduct, in order to recover damages the plaintiff
must prove that the statement was false and "was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New
York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The same test applies when the plaintiff is a public figure.
See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
When the plaintiff is a private figure and the defamatory speech addresses a matter of
public concern, the plaintiff still must prove the falsity of the statement, but the states can
define their own liability standards for actual injury suffered by the plaintiff "so long as they do
not impose liability without fault." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). To
recover punitive or presumed damages, the plaintiff, in addition to proving falsity, must meet
the New York Times actual malice standard. Id. at 349-50. In Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S.
749, a case involving a private-figure plaintiff and speech about a private concern, the Court
held that the actual malice standard was inapplicable, id., but left unclear the liability standard
as well as the question of whether the plaintiff had the burden of proving falsity or the defend-
ant had the burden of proving truth, see id. For a discussion of the development of First
Amendment law concerning defamatory speech, including the definitions of "public official,"
"public figure" and "private figure," see TRIBE, supra note 126, §§ 12-12 to -13.
156. E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989) C" 'If there be time to expose through
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy
to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."' (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring))); TRBE, supra note 126, § 12-8, at 833-34.
157. See supra note 60 for a discussion of the elements of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
158. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
159. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
160. Id. at 50.
161. Jerry Falwell is "a nationally known minister who has been active as a commentator
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circulated magazine. 162 The parody was based on a series of actual print
ads for Campari Liqueur that contained interviews with celebrities about
their "first times.' ' 163 While the ads used the sexual double entendre re-
garding "first times," it was clear by the end of each interview that the
phrase referred to the first time the interviewee tried Campari.'1 4 Hus-
tler's editors copied the form and layout of Campari's ads and created a
fictional "interview" with Falwell "in which he states that his 'first time'
was during a drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an out-
house."1 65 Hustler's parody portrayed Falwell and his mother as intoxi-
cated and immoral, and it suggested that Falwell was "a hypocrite who
preache[d] only when he [was] drunk." 166 In the magazine's table of
contents, the ad was listed as "'Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody,'"
and the ad contained, in small print, a disclaimer at the bottom of the
page which said, "'ad parody-not to be taken seriously.' "167
Shortly after the issue containing the ad became publicly available,
Falwell sued Hustler, Larry Flynt (Hustler's publisher) and Flynt Dis-
tributing Co. in federal court for libel and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. 168 The jury found for the defendants on the libel claim, as
a reasonable person could not believe the ad parody was describing genu-
ine facts about Falwell or real events in which he participated. 169 How-
ever, the jury ruled in favor of Falwell on his intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim and, in addition to awarding him $100,000 in
compensatory damages, assessed punitive damages in the amount of
$50,000 each against Hustler and Flynt.170 Hustler and Flynt moved for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but the district court denied their
motion. 171
Hustler and Flynt appealed, but the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
on politics and public affairs." Id. at 47. For First Amendment purposes, he is clearly a
"public figure," id at 57, a conclusion which neither party disputed, id. at 57 n.5.
162. Id at 47-48.
163. Id at 48.
164. Id
165. Id.
166. Id
167. Id
168. Id at 47-48. Falwell also tried to recover damages for invasion of privacy, id., but the
district court granted a directed verdict for the defendants on Falwell's invasion of privacy
claim, id at 48.
169. Id at 49.
170. Id Flynt Distributing Co. was not found liable at all and therefore was not a party
when the case reached the Supreme Court. Id. at 49 n.2.
171. Id at 49.
[Vol. 25:14091428
June 1992] FREE SPEECH AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 1429
Circuit affirmed the judgment against them.'7 2 The court of appeals
agreed that because of Falwell's status as a public figure, Hustler and
Flynt were "entitled to the same level of first amendment protection in
the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress that they received
in Falwell's claim for libel."' 73 But the Fourth Circuit believed this did
not mean that a literal application of the New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van 174 "actual malice" rule 175 was appropriate in a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.1 76 The appeals court interpreted New
York Times as placing emphasis for constitutional purposes on the actual
malice standard's heightened culpability requirement rather than on the
falsity of the statement at issue.' 7 7 The appeals court found the New
York Times standard satisfied because under Virginia law, defendants
must act intentionally or recklessly to be liable for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and the jury found Hustler and Flynt had acted
with such a mental state. 17  The court rejected as irrelevant "the conten-
tion that because the jury found that the ad parody did not describe ac-
tual facts about [Falwell], the ad was an opinion that is protected by the
First Amendment."' 79 The court believed the issue was whether the par-
172. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
173. Id. at 1274.
174. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
175. See supra note 155.
176. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 49; Falwell, 797 F.2d at 1274.
177. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 49.
178. Id. at 49-50 & 50 n.3.
179. Id. at 50. Until recently, there appeared to be a clear distinction between statements of
"opinion" and statements of "fact" for First Amendment purposes. See Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705-06 (1990). Prior to the Milkovich decision, a number of
lower courts and commentators believed that opinions were absolutely privileged under the
First Amendment and that only false statements of fact were actionable. See, e.g., id.; Olman
v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (evaluating totality of circumstances, considering
four factors, to determine whether statement was fact or opinion; four factors were: (1) spe-
cific language of statement; (2) verifiability of statement; (3) full context of statement; and (4)
broader context or setting in which statement appeared), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
The following dictum from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), provided the
basis for this belief, see Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705-06:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However perni-
cious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional
value in false statements of fact.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40 (footnote omitted).
In Milkovich, however, the Court stated:
[W]e do not think this passage from Gertz was intended to create a wholesale...
exemption for anything that might be labeled "opinion." Not only would such an
interpretation be contrary to the tenor and context of the passage, but it would also
ignore the fact that expressions of "opinion" may often imply an assertion of objec-
tive fact.
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ody was outrageous enough to be actionable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.1 80
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
court of appeals, finding that an award of damages based on Falwell's
claim would be inconsistent with the First Amendment."' The Court
began its analysis by stressing the importance of the First Amendment in
American society as a means for seeking truth as well as a valuable end
in itself:
At the heart of the First Amendment is the recognition of the
fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions
110 S. Ct. at 2705 (citation omitted). The Court rejected the proposition that the First
Amendment mandates a decision of whether a statement is "fact" or "opinion" to determine
whether it is actionable, stating that the lower courts erroneously relied on the Gertz dictum in
developing tests to decide which is which. Id. at 2706. The Court stated that there was no
need to create "an artificial dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact," because existing constitu-
tional doctrine, based on requirements developed from prior cases, adequately protects free-
dom of expression. Id Foremost among the requirements is "the proposition that a statement
on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability." Id. Thus,
partially because "a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not
contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection," id. (em-
phasis added), the Court was "not persuaded that, in addition to [existing] protections, an
additional separate constitutional privilege for 'opinion' is required to ensure the freedom of
expression guaranteed by the First Amendment," id. at 2707.
Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, agreed with the Court's analysis of the protec-
tion to be afforded statements of opinion, but disagreed with the Court's application of the
specified general rules to the facts of the case. Id. at 2708-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Ac-
cording to Justice Brennan, "while the Court today dispels any misimpression that there is a
so-called opinion privilege wholly in addition to the protections we have already found to be
guaranteed by the First Amendment, it determines that a protection for statements of pure
opinion is dictated by existing First Amendment doctrine." Id at 2708 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). While the Court in Milkovich "reserved judgment on cases involving nonmedia defend-
ants," id. at 2706 n.6, regarding the question of whether "a statement on matters of public
concern must be provable as false before there can be liability," id. at 2706, Justice Brennan
stated that "'a distinction [between media and nonmedia defendants] is "irreconcilable with
the fundamental First Amendment principle that '[t]he inherent worth of... speech in terms
of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of the source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual,' '" id. at 2708 n.2 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (second alteration in original) (quoting Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475
U.S. 767, 780 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted)).
While the Milkovich decision did not provide lower courts with much guidance on the
question of whether a statement is provable as false and therefore actionable, Milkovich will
not change the law regarding this question in many jurisdictions because lower courts have
used criteria since Gertz that are consistent with the Milkovich limitations. The Supreme
Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REv. 219, 219 (1990). For further discus-
sion of Milkovich, including its application to Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc.,
571 N.E.2d 340 (Mass.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 191 (1991), see infra notes 237-63 and accom-
panying text.
180. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50.
181. Id at 57.
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on matters of public interest and concern. "[T]he freedom to
speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty-
and thus a good unto itself-but also is essential to the common
quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole." We have
therefore been particularly vigilant to ensure that individual ex-
pressions of ideas remain free from governmentally imposed
sanctions. 182
Accordingly, "[tlhe First Amendment recognizes no such thing as a
'false' idea."
183
Conversely, however, false statements of fact have little value, as
"they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of
ideas." '184 Moreover, in defamation cases, such falsehoods damage the
reputation of an individual that cannot be remedied easily by counter-
speech, 1 5 even when such counterspeech is persuasive or effective.' 6
But despite the minimal value of these falsehoods, "they are 'nevertheless
inevitable in free debate.' "187 Therefore, to provide breathing space for
freedom of expression and alleviate the "chilling" effect on constitution-
ally valuable speech relating to public figures, the actual malice standard
of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 18 was developed.18 9
The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's view that as long as the
elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress were present it was
constitutionally irrelevant whether the statement at issue was an opinion
or a fact, or whether it was true or false. 90 Although the intent to cause
emotional distress understandably has been made civilly culpable in most
if not all jurisdictions when the conduct at issue is sufficiently intolerable,
in the context of discourse about public affairs the First Amendment pro-
tects a speaker even when he or she is motivated by ill will or hatred.' 9 1
The Court noted:
"Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker
must run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke
out of hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances
182. Id at 50-51 (alteration in original) (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984)).
183. Id. at 51.
184. Id at 52.
185. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
186. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 52.
187. Id. (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)).
188. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See supra note 155 for discussion of the actual malice standard.
189. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 52.
190. See id. at 52-53.
191. Id. at 53.
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honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and
the ascertainment of truth."192
Additionally, the Court feared that unpopular views would be cen-
sored if a speaker could be held liable for "outrageous" 193 speech on mat-
ters of public importance. "'Outrageousness' in the area of political and
social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would al-
low a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or
perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression." '94 The
Court noted an "outrageousness" standard is inconsistent with its long-
standing refusal to allow damage awards based on the audience's poten-
tially adverse emotional reaction to speech.
195
The Court therefore concluded that the actual malice standard from
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 196 applied to intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims brought by public officials and public figures
based on a defendant's speech. 197 In order to recover damages, public
officials and public figures must show, in addition to the other elements
of the tort claim, that the defendant made a false statement with knowl-
edge of the statement's falsity or reckless disregard as to its truth.198 The
New York Times standard is not blindly applied in this context; rather it
is necessary to provide sufficient "breathing space" to First Amendment
freedoms.199 As it was not reasonable to believe that the ad parody
stated actual facts2"° about Falwell, whose status as a public figure was
192. Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964)).
193. See supra note 60.
194. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 55.
195. Id. The Court stated:
"[Tihe fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for sup-
pressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence
is a reason for according it constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet of the
First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of
ideas."
Id. at 55-56 (alteration in original) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46
(1978)).
196. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
197. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56.
198. Id.
199. Id
200. In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990), the Supreme Court said
that "statements that cannot 'reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts'" are not ac-
tionable. Id at 2706 (alteration in original) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 50 (1988)). Such protection is necessary to guarantee "that public debate will not
suffer for lack of 'imaginative expression' or the 'rhetorical hypberbole' which has traditionally
added much to the discourse of our Nation." Id
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undisputed,2° ' the First Amendment barred Falwell from recovering
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 °2
D. Murphy Under the Free Speech Clause
When the applicability of the Free Exercise Clause is doubtful or
questionable, the Free Speech Clause by itself will often protect defend-
ants from intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. To demon-
strate this, imagine a case with facts identical to Murphy v. LS.K. Con. of
New England, Inc. ,203 with the exception that the defendant does not
unequivocally qualify for free exercise protection.2 4
As an initial matter, ISKCON N.E. is entitled to free speech protec-
tion because its status as "a corporation does not remove its speech from
the ambit of the First Amendment. ' 205 Next, Susan's claim implicates
the Free Speech Clause's guarantees because it involves state action
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 6 Susan's claim is
not based on ISKCON N.E.'s conduct; it is based on ISKCON N.E.'s
speech, in that Susan claims her damages flow from exposure to
ISKCON N.E.'s beliefs20 7 regarding the relative value and proper role of
women in society.2"8 Because a judgment for Susan on her intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim would amount to a viewpoint-
based 20 9 restriction210 of ISKCON N.E.'s speech, the First Amendment
limits her ability to recover damages.21'
After Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, Inc. 212 it is clear that First
Amendment principles limit "a State's authority to protect its citizens
from the intentional infliction of emotional distress."2 3 This is because
of "the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on
matters of public interest and concern." '214 When the plaintiff is a public
201. See supra note 161.
202. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 57.
203. 571 N.E.2d 340 (Mass.), cerL denied, 112 S. Ct. 191 (1991).
204. For the sake of clarity, this Note will continue to refer to ISKCON N.E. as the defend-
ant, but will assume ISKCON N.E. is not clearly entitled to free exercise protection.
205. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990).
206. See supra note 2.
207. See supra notes 61, 65, 78-84 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 88, 90 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 157-202, infra notes 212-63 and accompanying text.
212. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
213. Id. at 50.
214. Id.
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official or a public figure,215 the actual malice216 standard from New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan 217 applies to intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress claims.218 In such circumstances, recovery is barred unless the
plaintiff shows that the defendant either knowingly made a false state-
ment or made a false statement with reckless disregard as to its truth or
falsity.
2 19
However, Susan cannot by any means be considered a public figure
or a public official, so the Falwell standard cannot apply. To what ex-
tent, then, does the First Amendment limit Susan's claim? One way to
determine the appropriate standard is to borrow the analogous standard
from the area of defamation,220 much as the Falwell Court borrowed the
New York Times standard.221 Surely, the same considerations that led
the Court in Falwell to conclude that the New York Times "standard is
necessary to give adequate 'breathing space' to the freedoms protected by
the First Amendment" 222 would lead to the conclusion that Susan must
at least223 meet the parallel defamation standard in order to recover
damages.224
As ISKCON N.E.'s expression of ideas regarding the worth and
function of women in society225 pertains to matters of public concern,
226
at a minimum the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 227 standards would appear
to apply.228 Under Gertz, in order for Susan as a private figure to clear
the hurdle presented by the First Amendment and have an actionable
claim for compensatory damages, she would have to prove that ISKCON
215. See supra note 155.
216. See supra note 155 for discussion of the actual malice standard.
217. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
218. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
220. For a discussion of the various defamation standards, see supra note 155.
221. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56; see also Foretich v. Glamour, 753 F. Supp. 955, 970
(D.D.C. 1990) ("TIhe Supreme Court [in Falwell] concluded that the First Amendment's
concern for robust public debate is applicable to emotional distress claims as well as defama-
tion claims.").
222. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56.
223. See infra note 231.
224. See Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50-56.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
226. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761-62 (1985)
(Powell, J., plurality); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outra-
geous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV.
601, 671 (1990) ("[Most would unquestionably consider as public discourse the public discus-
sion of such [an] issue[ ] as the proper role of motherhood ... even if this discussion did not
occur within the specific context of any proposed or actual government action.").
227. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
228. See supra note 155.
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N.E. made at least one false statement with some level of fault.229 Gertz
would require Susan to meet the Falwell/New York Times standard in
order to recover punitive damages.230
However, the requisite level of culpability23' is not the key consider-
ation in determining whether Susan can recover for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. The critical element of the Falwell standard which
surely applies to Susan's claim, even though she is a private figure, is the
requirement that a false statement was made by ISKCON N.E.232 While
Falwell involved a public-figure plaintiff, the rationale and language of
the Court's opinion show that the threshold requirement of a false state-
ment also applies in cases where private-figure plaintiffs seek damages for
emotional distress resulting from the expression of "ideas and opinions
229. See supra note 155.
230. See supra note 155.
231. Arguably, the Gertz standard for actual damages should not apply to intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress claims such as Susan's, and the plaintiff should be required to prove
that the defendant's allegedly false statements, see infra notes 32-49 and accompanying text,
were made with a greater level of culpability than mere negligence. The Court in Falwell
stated that "[flalse statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-
seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual's reputa-
tion that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective." Falwell,
485 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added). This rationale is only partly applicable to a claim such as
Susan's, as the speech in question, regarding the value and proper role of women, is not about
Susan as an individual. Therefore, the speech in question cannot damage her reputation. But
see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (5-4 decision), in which the Supreme Court
upheld a conviction under a group libel statute that prohibited the publication or exhibition of
materials promoting racial or religious hatred. However, many courts and commentators
"have expressed doubt.., that Beauharnais remains good law at all after the constitutional
libel cases." Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978);
see, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 331 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd
mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); TRIBE, supra note 126, § 12-12, at 861 n.2.
When the plaintiff has no reputational interest at stake, the threat that false statements
pose to "the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas," Falwell, 485 U.S. at 52, does
not seem as great as the danger presented by the Gertz negligence standard, a rule of liability
which would chill constitutionally valuable speech about matters of public concern. See, eg.,
id. at 52-53. Additionally, effective and timely counterspeech can correct any malfunction of
the marketplace of ideas' ascertainment of the truth, see supra note 151, and easily repair any
damage an individual might suffer as a result of exposure to false statements. See supra note
156 and accompanying text. For all of these reasons, when the speech in question is not about
the plaintiff, the Falwell/New York Times actual malice standard might apply even when the
plaintiff is a private figure who seeks only actual damages for intentional infliction of emotional
distress caused by allegedly false statements of public concern. See also Dun & Bradstreet, 472
U.S. at 756-61 (Powell, J., plurality) (balancing First Amendment interest in freedom of ex-
pression against competing state interest in compensating private-figure plaintiffs for reputa-
tional damage when defamatory statements do not involve issue of public concern).
232. See Deupree v. Iliff, 860 F.2d 300, 304-05 (8th Cir. 1988); Walko v. Kean College, 561
A.2d 680, 685-86 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
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on matters of public interest and concern. '233 Such opinions must be
allowed to flow freely, even when the plaintiff is a private figure, because
freedom of speech is an end in itself as well as a means to the discovery of
truth through the operation of the marketplace of ideas.234 These princi-
ples would be undermined if liability for speech could be imposed merely
because society finds the ideas expressed offensive, distasteful or outra-
geous.235 Susan's claim is therefore barred by the First Amendment if
none of ISKCON N.E.'s statements are provable as false.236
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. 237 the United States Supreme
Court held "that a statement on matters of public concern must be prov-
able as false before [a defendant] can be liab[le]" for the statement.238
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Milkovich, stated
that "a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which
does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full
constitutional protection. "239 While the Court did not give much gui-
dance2  on the question of whether a statement contains a factual con-
notation that is provably false, the Court did give an example of a
statement that would be actionable and contrasted it with an example of
a statement that would not be actionable.24 The Court stated: "Unlike
233. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50.
234. Eg., id. at 50-52.
235. E.g., id. at 55; see also Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) ("[IThe public
expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to
some of their hearers."); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion ....").
236. Susan's status as a minor should not change the requirement that she must prove the
defendant made a false statement before liability can attach. While it is true the state's interest
in protecting children from exposure to speech that may be considered harmful is greater than
the state's interest in protecting adults from such speech, see, eg., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978), the danger that the inherently subjective "outrageousness" test will allow
juries to censor unpopular views, Falwell, 485 U.S. at 55; see supra notes 193-95 and accompa-
nying text, is not diminished by a plaintiff's minor status and necessitates proof of falsity
before there can be liability. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text. Moreover, since
ISKCON N.E. made the statements at regularly scheduled meetings that Susan attended, see
supra text accompanying note 96, regulation of these statements through the imposition of tort
liability without proof of falsity, even for the compelling purpose of protecting children, is not
narrowly tailored enough to pass strict scrutiny, as such regulation would have the invalid
effect of confining the content of ISKCON N.E.'s meetings to material that is fit for children to
hear, see, e.g., Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989).
237. 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990). For a further discussion of Milkovich, see supra note 179.
238. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
239. Id. A statement that "impl[ies] an assertion of objective fact," id. at 2705, is one that
"contain[s] a provably false factual connotation," id. at 2706. See id. at 2705-06.
240. See supra note 179.
241. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
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the statement, 'In my opinion Mayor Jones is a liar,' the statement, 'In
my opinion Mayor Jones shows his abysmal ignorance by accepting the
teachings of Marx and Lenin,' would not be actionable."'242 The Court
also focused on the need for "a core of objective evidence" to determine
whether a statement is actionable.243 "'Unlike a subjective assertion...
language [is actionable if it] is an articulation of an objectively verifiable
event.' "244
In Foretich v. Glamour,2 ' a post-Milkovich decision, one of the
statements at issue was " 'that a mother shall protect her young, no mat-
ter the cost to herself.' "246 The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia recognized that Milkovich controlled the disposition of
claims based on this statement and, as a matter of law, required that
these claims be dismissed.247 The court said the statement was merely
opinion; it was clear that the truth or falsity of any facts stated or reason-
ably implied from this statement could not be proven.248 "That a mother
must protect her young... cannot be deemed [a] verifiable statement[]
of fact."
' 249
When the six statements by ISKCON N.E. upon which Susan based
her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim are analyzed, it is
apparent that her claim is barred because none of these statements are
provable as false. ISKCON N.E.'s first statement at issue is that "'wo-
men are inferior to men.' ,,250 This statement is not actionable because it
neither states nor implies any objectively verifiable fact;21 the concept of
"inferiority" is inherently subjective and cannot be objectively mea-
sured.2 52 The second statement, that "'the female form is the form of
evil,' "253 and the fourth statement, that "'it is better for a woman to
have to bear a son and that female children are not as good as male
242. Id.
243. Id. at 2707.
244. Id (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707 (Ohio 1986)).
245. 753 F. Supp. 955 (D.D.C. 1990). While the claims, facts and status of the parties in
Foretich differed substantially from those in Murphy, those differences are not relevant to a
determination of whether the statements at issue are provably false.
246. Id. at 965.
247. Id.
248. Id at 966.
249. Id
250. Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 346 (Mass.), cert. de-
nied, 112 S. Ct. 191 (1991); see supra text accompanying note 63.
251. See supra note 239.
252. In this respect, it is similar to the example given in Milkovich of a statement that is not
actionable. See supra text accompanying note 242.
253. Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 346; see supra text accompanying note 63.
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children,' ,254 are not actionable for the same reason. Both statements
are simply "'subjective asertion[s].' "255
Another subjective assertion, that "'the woman has no position
which is independent of man,' ,,256 is found in the first half of the sixth
statement. The second half of that statement, that a woman "'should
take her husband as her spiritual authority,' ,,257 is similar to the state-
ment at issue in Foretich and therefore not factually verifiable. 25 8 Like-
wise, the third statement, that " 'one should be very careful to cover the
body so that men are not attracted to [women],' ",259 is not factually veri-
fiable by objective evidence.
The remaining statement is that women "'should always consult a
higher person before making any type of decision because women are less
intelligent than men.' ",26 Of the six statements, this one comes closest
to containing an objectively verifiable fact. Ultimately, however, it is not
actionable. The first part of the statement, regarding what women
"should" do, is another assertion similar to that in Foretich. To the ex-
tent that the statement implies that men are "higher" than women, it is
merely another subjective assertion.
However, the second part of the statement, stating that men are
more intelligent than women, is not dismissed quite so easily. Whether
the statement can be interpreted to assert that the average man is more
intelligent than the average woman, or that all men are more intelligent
than all women, it appears objectively verifiable and hence capable of
being proven false. After all, there are scales which measure intelli-
gence, 26 1 and one could examine results from a statistically appropriate
254. Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 346 n.8; see supra text accompanying note 64.
255. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707 (quoting Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 707
(Ohio 1986)); see supra text accompanying note 244.
256. Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 347 n.8; see supra text accompanying note 64.
257. Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 347 n.8; see supra text accompanying note 64.
258. See supra notes 245-49 and accompanying text. To the extent that the statement that
a woman "should take her husband as her spiritual authority" connotes that marriage is desir-
able, the statement is merely a subjective assertion; to the extent that the statement implies or
assumes that many or most women are married, no objectively verifiable assertion is made
regarding what percentage of women are married. Even if such an objectively verifiable state-
ment were made, it is difficult to imagine what emotional damage could flow from a false
statement regarding the incidence of marriage.
259. Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 346 (alteration in original); see supra text accompanying note
63.
260. Murphy, 571 N.E.2d at 346-47 n.8; see supra text accompanying note 64.
261. The intelligence test most widely used is the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, e.g.,
HAROLD I. KAPLAN, M.D. & BENJAMIN J. SADOCK, M.D., SYNOPSIS OF PSYCHIATRY 156
(6th ed. 1991), while another commonly used test is the Stanford-Binet Test, see, e.g., Id. at
157. See also United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 724 & n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting
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sample of men and women to see if the statement is "true." In spite of
the fact that a given group's scores on an intelligence test could be objec-
tively compared to those of another group, the scores themselves cannot
be said to objectively measure intelligence. First, available intelligence
tests cannot measure increments of intellectual ability past the age of fif-
teen.262 In addition:
As measured by most intelligence tests, [the intelligence
quotient or] I.Q. is an interpretation or classification of a total
test score in relation to norms established by a group.... A
person's I.Q. must be examined in the light of past experiences
The I.Q. itself is no indicator of the origins of its reflected
capacities, genetic (innate) or environmental. The most useful
intelligence test must measure a variety of skills and abilities,
including verbal and performance, early learned and recently
learned, timed and untimed, culture-free and culture-bound.
No intelligence test is totally culture-free, although tests do dif-
fer significantly in degree.263
Therefore, as no objective measure of intelligence exists, the statement is
not actionable.
Since none of ISKCON N.E.'s statements are provably false,
ISKCON N.E. could not be held liable for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress under the Free Speech Clause. Ultimately, this result "is
dictated by the fundamental proposition that if [free speech] rights are to
remain vital for all, they must protect not only those society deems ac-
ceptable, but also those whose ideas it quite justifiably rejects and
despises. '
IV. CONCLUSION
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court correctly decided Mur-
phy v. LS.K.Con. of New England, Inc.265 Susan's intentional infliction
of emotional distress claim was based on the notion that exposure to
Krishna Consciousness caused her tortious emotional damage. She sup-
ported her claim by reading passages from scriptural texts and testifying
as to what she had learned regarding the role of women in Krishna Con-
that appellant's score on Revised Beta Intelligence Test equated to mild retardation under
Wechsler and Stanford-Binet schemes).
262. E.g., KAPLAN & SADOCK, supra note 261, at 155.
263. Id. at 156.
264. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
265. 571 N.E.2d 340 (Mass.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 191 (1991).
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sciousness. The verdict in her favor infringed ISKCON N.E.'s right to
freely believe the principles of its chosen religion; the jury had been per-
mitted to penalize ISKCON N.E. for the content of its unusual religious
beliefs, a result clearly proscribed by the Free Exercise Clause.
However, reliance on the Free Exercise Clause, while unquestiona-
bly warranted in this case, was not crucial to a finding in favor of
ISKCON N.E. As the statements upon which Susan based her claim
were not provably false, her claim was not actionable for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress under the Free Speech Clause. In future
cases factually similar to Murphy, where a defendant's ability to use the
Free Exercise Clause as a shield from liability is uncertain because of the
defendant's unclear religious status, the free exercise question will often
be moot because courts can dispose of intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims on free speech grounds.
Mark A. Snyder *
* This Note is dedicated to my parents, Joyce and Richard Snyder, and my brother,
Scott Snyder, for their love, support and encouragement. The author also wishes to thank
Professors Marcy Strauss and Lawrence B. Solum for their insightful comments and
suggestions.
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